SNSI研究員・愛知大学国際問題研究所客員研究員の古村治彦のブログです。翻訳と評論の分野で活動しています。日常、考えたことを文章にして発表していきたいと思います。古村治彦の経歴などについては、以下のアドレスをご覧ください。http://soejimaronbun.sakura.ne.jp/goaisatsu.html 連絡先は、harryfurumura@gmail.com です。twitter accountは、@Harryfurumura です。よろしくお願いします。












●「トランプ氏、対北朝鮮「中国は影響力を」 核増強も表明」























North Korean officials are preparing to come to U.S. for talks with former officials


By Anna Fifield February 19

Washington Post



KUALA LUMPUR, Malaysia — Preparations are underway to bring senior North Korean representatives to the United States for talks with former American officials, the first such meeting in more than five years and a sign that Pyongyang sees a potential opening with the Trump administration.


Arranging the talks has become a lot more complicated over the past eight days, with North Korea testing a ballistic missile and the assassination of Kim Jong Un’s half brother in Malaysia, an act that many suspect was ordered by the leader of North Korea. Malaysian police on Sunday named as suspects four North Koreans who left the country on the day of the attack. 


Analysts also say they highly doubt that Pyongyang, which has insisted on being recognized as a nuclear state, would be willing to moderate its position on its weapons program. 


If the talks do take place, they could offer a glimmer of hope for an already-hostile relationship that has only deteriorated as the Kim government works aggressively to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of reaching the continental United States.


The planning for the “Track 1.5” talks — with the U.S. side made up of the former officials who usually take part in Track 2 talks, but the North Korean side composed of government officials — is still in a preparatory stage, according to people with knowledge of the arrangements.


What we know about the alleged assassination of Kim Jong Nam  Play Video2:09

The older half-brother of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was killed in Malaysia in an apparent poisoning attack carried out by two female agents. (The Washington Post)

The State Department has not approved the North Koreans’ visas for the talks, which would take place in New York within the next few weeks.


The North Koreans have expressed an interest in engagement, but nothing’s been approved yet,” said one person familiar with the preparations, speaking on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss them.


Others who have been in touch with North Koreans describe an intense interest in what President Trump might do.


If this happens, it would be an interesting signal to the new administration,” one person said of the discussions.


The talks would be the clearest indication yet that Kim wants to talk with the Trump administration. “If this happens, I would take it as a very positive sign from both sides,” said another person with knowledge of the arrangements.


In recent years, there have been sporadic Track 1.5 talks that have taken place in Kuala Lumpur, Geneva, Berlin and Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. But these talks have not taken place in the United States since July 2011, before Kim succeeded his father in North Korea.


The planned talks are being organized by Donald S. Zagoria of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, who served as a consultant on Asia during the Carter administration and has organized previous rounds of such talks. Zagoria declined to comment on the preparations.


The talks would be run independently of the State Department, where officials have privately questioned the utility of such discussions. But if the administration issued the visas, it would be an implicit seal of approval. And if the discussions go well, they could pave the way for official talks.


Choe Son Hui, the director of the U.S. affairs department in North Korea’s Foreign Ministry, is likely to lead the delegation from Pyongyang. She is well known to American officials, having participated in official meetings including the six-party talks on denuclearization, as well as in other Track 1.5 talks.


Choe has a direct line to Kim, according to Thae Yong Ho, the North Korean deputy ambassador to London who defected to South Korea last year.


Since Trump was elected, there has been a notable change in North Korea’s usually bombastic rhetoric.


Pyongyang had been sharply critical of the Obama administration, saying its policy of “strategic patience” — waiting for North Korea to change its nuclear calculations — was “an aggressive and heinous ‘strategic suffocation’ policy” against North Korea.


But in its announcement of its missile launch Feb. 12, the North’s state media did not include its usual bluster about needing a deterrent against the United States and its “hostile policies.”


In his own statement after the launch, Trump notably did not condemn Pyongyang. The new president has, in fact, said very little about how he plans to deal with North Korea. “North Korea — we’ll take care of it folks, we’re going to take care of it all,” he said at his news conference last week, without elaborating.


His administration is conducting a review of North Korea policy. This provides space to broaden the options for dealing with Pyongyang and an opportunity to influence the new president, analysts say. 


While some expect him to take a hard-line approach, encouraged by hawkish advisers, others say that Trump, who prides himself on making deals, could be open to dialogue with the North Korean regime.


U.S. policy is hanging in the balance,” said Adam Cathcart, an expert on North Korea at the University of Leeds in Britain. 


I think the North Koreans ought to be pretty happy, because the Americans have laid off criticizing them too much and have, in fact, been making things quite easy for them,” Cathcart said. “But at some point, they are going to have to decide whether to pick up the cudgel.”


For those favoring an even tougher approach to North Korea, recent events have provided plenty of ammunition.


On Feb. 12, North Korea tested a ballistic missile for the first time since Trump was elected. The missile appeared to show significant technological advances, with upgraded power and range, and could mark another step in the push toward the capacity to hit Alaska or Washington state.




 この記事は少し古いのですが、2017年2月19日付の『ワシントン・ポスト』紙に掲載されました。北朝鮮外務省のアメリカ担当部長が代表団を連れて、アメリカ訪問を行う準備をしている、というものです。アメリカ側で応対するのは、シンクタンクの幹部で、ジミー・カーター政権で、ホワイトハウスに属する国家安全保障会議、そして国務省で東アジア担当コンサルタントを務めたドナルド・S・ザゴリア(Donald S. Zagoria、88歳)です。ザゴリアは、コロンビア大学で博士号を取得した東アジア専門家で、北朝鮮問題に詳しい人物のようです。


 ザゴリアは現在、アメリカ外交政策全国委員会(National Committee on American Foreign Policy、NCAFP)というシンクタンクの上級副会長を務めています。NCAFPの創設者は国際関係論という学問分野でリアリズム(Realism)の泰斗と呼ばれたハンス・J・モーゲンソー(Hans Joachim Morgenthau、1904―1980年)です。ハンス・モーゲンソーの大著『国際政治(Politics Among Nations)』は、国際関係論における古典となり、授業では必ず読みます(日本ではどうかわかりません)。モーゲンソーはイデオロギーを排し、国際関係論を「学問(Science、合理的推論を使いながら、因果関係に基づく法則を発見する行為)」にまで昇華させようと奮闘した学者です。「力(Power)」と「国益(National Interest)」という概念を用いて分析を行う手法を採り、「勢力均衡(Balance of Power)」を主張した人物です。

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 私が翻訳した本に『野望の中国近現代史 帝国は復活する』(オーヴィル・シェル、ジョン・デルリー著、ビジネス社、2014年)があります。これは、アヘン戦争以降の歴史を中国の近代化に貢献した人々を各省で1人ずつ取り上げたもの(列伝)です。この本の背骨(バックボーン)となるテーマは、「中国はアヘン戦争以降、恥辱の世紀(a century of humiliation)を過ごしてきた(これ以降、中国は外国に侵略され、富を奪われていきました)。近代化に貢献した人々(改革者)は、この恥辱をそそぎ、富強(wealth and power)の復活を目指してきた(アヘン戦争直前まで中国は力を落としつつありましたが世界最大の経済大国でした)」というものです。


Make America Great Again)」こそが、自分たちの主張そのものだと感じ、トランプを支持しました。逆に言うと、トランプが時代の「空気」を的確につかむことに成功しました。この「昔偉大だった我が国は今凋落している。それを再び偉大にするのだ」という思考は、中国近現代史と相通じるものがあります。










By Adam Gopnik , SEPTEMBER 12, 2015



Once, and only once, in 2011, have I attended the annual White House Correspondents’ Association dinner in Washington, D.C., on the grounds, as I explained then, that Voltaire is said to have cited when he declined a second invitation to an orgy: once a philosopher, twice a pervert. Luckily for the philosopher in me, it turned out to be an auspicious night. Not only, as we did not know then, was President Obama in the midst of the operation that would lead shortly to Osama bin Laden’s killing; it was also the night when, despite that preoccupation, the President took apart Donald Trump, plastic piece by orange part, and then refused to put him back together again.


Trump was then at the height of his unimaginably ugly marketing of birther fantasies, and, just days before, the state of Hawaii had, at the President’s request, released Obama’s long-form birth certificate in order to end, or try to end, the nonsense.  Having referred to that act, he then gently but acutely mocked Trump’s Presidential ambitions: “I know that he’s taken some flack lately—no one is prouder to put this birth-certificate matter to rest than the Donald. And that’s because he can finally get back to the issues that matter, like: did we fake the moon landing? What really happened in Roswell? And—where are Biggie and Tupac?” The President went on, “We all know about your credentials and breadth of experience. For example—no, seriously—just recently, in an episode of Celebrity Apprentice”—there was laughter at the mention of the program’s name. Obama explained that, when a team did not impress, Trump “didn’t blame Lil Jon or Meatloaf—you fired Gary Busey. And these are the kinds of decisions that would keep me up at night.”


What was really memorable about the event, though, was Trump’s response. Seated a few tables away from us magazine scribes, Trump’s humiliation was as absolute, and as visible, as any I have ever seen: his head set in place, like a man in a pillory, he barely moved or altered his expression as wave after wave of laughter struck him. There was not a trace of feigning good humor about him, not an ounce of the normal politician’s, or American regular guy’s “Hey, good one on me!” attitude—that thick-skinned cheerfulness that almost all American public people learn, however painfully, to cultivate. No head bobbing or hand-clapping or chin-shaking or sheepish grinning—he sat perfectly still, chin tight, in locked, unmovable rage. If he had not just embarked on so ugly an exercise in pure racism, one might almost have felt sorry for him.


Some day someone may well write a kind of micro-history of that night, as historians now are wont to do, as a pivot in American life, both a triumph of Obama’s own particular and enveloping form of cool and as harbinger of—well, of what exactly? A lot depends on what happens next with the Donald and his followers. Certainly, the notion that Trump’s rise, however long it lasts, is a product of a special skill, or circumstance, or a new national “mood,” is absurd. Trumpism is a permanent part of American lifein one form or another, with one voice or another blaring it out. At any moment in our modern history, some form of populist nationalism has always held some significant share—whether five or ten per cent – of the population. Among embittered white men, Trump’s “base,” it has often held a share much larger than that. Trump is not offering anything that was not offered before him, often in identical language and with a similarly incoherent political program, by Pat Buchanan or Ross Perot, by George Wallace or Barry Goldwater, or way back when by Father Coughlin or Huey Long. Populist nationalism is not an eruptive response to a new condition of 2015—it is a perennial ideological position, deeply rooted in the nature of modernity: a social class sees its perceived displacement as the result of a double conspiracy of outsiders and élitists. The outsiders are swamping us, and the insiders are mocking us—this ideology alters its local color as circumstances change, but the essential core is always there. They look down on us and they have no right to look down on us. Indeed, the politics of Trump, far from being in any way new, are exactly the politics of Huck Finn’s drunken father in “Huckleberry Finn”: “Call this a govment! Just look at it and see what it’s like . . . . A man can’t get his rights in a govment like this.” Widespread dissatisfaction with all professional politicians, a certainty of having been “sold out,” a feeling of complete alienation from both political parties—“Not a dime’s worth of difference between them” was George Wallace’s formulation, a half century ago—these are permanent intuitions of the American aggrieved. The feelings may be somewhat aggravated by bad times, or alleviated by good ones, but at the height of the prosperous fifties a significant proportion of Americans were persuaded that the entire government was in the hands of saboteurs and traitors at the pay of a foreign power, while in the still more prosperous nineties a similar faction was persuaded that the liberal President was actually a coke dealer who had murdered a friend.


Nor is it at all surprising to find a billionaire businessman representing this ideology, because it is not really members of the economic élite who are its villains—it is the educated élite, and the uneducated outsiders, who are. It is, on the historical record, much more a response to the ceaseless anxieties of modern life than to any financial angst of the moment. Probably the best student of this modern ideology is the conservative historian John Lukacs, whose 2005 book “Democracy And Populism: Fear and Hatred” makes clear how different the nationalist formula is from patriotism properly so called: it rests not on a sense of pride in place or background but in an intense sense of victimization. The cry of the genuine patriot is “Leave us alone to be the people we have always been.” The populist nationalist cries, “We have been cheated of our birthright, and the Leader will give it back.”


The ideology is always available; it just changes its agents from time to time.


And this is where memories of the President’s performance come into play and take on a potency that one might not have understood at the time. For the politics of populist nationalism are almost entirely the politics of felt humiliation—the politics of shame. And one can’t help but suspect that, on that night, Trump’s own sense of public humiliation became so overwhelming that he decided, perhaps at first unconsciously, that he would, somehow, get his own back—perhaps even pursue the Presidency after all, no matter how nihilistically or absurdly, and redeem himself. Though he gave up the hunt for office in that campaign, it does not seem too far-fetched to imagine that the rage—Lukacs’s fear and hatred—implanted in him that night has fuelled him ever since. It was already easy to sense at the time that something very strange had happened – that the usual American ritual of the “roast” and the roasted had been weirdly and uniquely disrupted. But the consequences were hard to imagine. The micro-history of that night yet to be written might be devoted largely to the double life of Barack Obama as cool comedian and quiet commander—or it might be devoted to the moment when new life was fed into an old ideology, when Trump’s ambitions suddenly turned over to the potent politics of shame and vengeance. His even partial triumph in the primary still seems unlikely—but stranger jokes have been played on American philosophers over the centuries.





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トランプはプリーバス、バノンをホワイトハウスの幹部スタッフに起用(Trump names Priebus, Bannon to WH staff





























トランプが政権以降ティームの再編のためにペンスを議長に(Pence takes lead as Trump reshapes transition team































クリスティとトランプの義理の息子の衝突が政権移行ティームの再編に発展(Christie feud with Trump's son-in-law led to transition team shakeup: report


































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古村 治彦









サイモン・イングラー(Simon Engler)筆





 オバマ大統領は、CIA副長官アヴリル・ヘインズ(Avril Haines)をスーザン・ライス(Susan Rice)国家安全保障問題担当大統領補佐官の副官(次席補佐官)に選んだ。ヘインズはオバマ政権発足時から、情報と外交政策の分野で活躍してきた。そして、これからホワイトハウスで重要な役割を果たすことになる。彼女は国家安全保障問題担当大統領補佐官職の伝統を受け継ぎ、これを発展させながら、同時にスーザン・ライスに権力が集中し、ホワイトハウスで何でも決定されているという批判とも戦うことになるだろう。




 現CIA副長官のヘインズは、国家安全保障問題担当大統領補佐官ライスと国土安全保障問題担当大統領補佐官リサ・モナコ(Lisa Monaco)の仲間入りをすることになる。ヘインズは、ホワイトハウスで国家安全保障と外交を担当する女性3名の1人となる。女性の民主党系の政策立案者としては、ミッシェル・フロノイの名前を忘れてはいけない。彼女は、国防長官を更迭されたチャック・ヘーゲルの後任の長官として最初に名前が挙がり、オバマ大統領が考える第一の候補であると言われたほどであった。





 ヘインズは、トニー・ブリンケン(Tony Bliknen)の後任として就任する予定である。ブリンケンは、国務副長官に転出する予定である。ヘインズはホワイトハウスで新たな役割を果たすことになる。彼女の仕事は、政府各省庁の副長官を集めて会議を主宰し、この会議で政策案を複数用意して、大統領と各省庁の長官がそれぞれを閣議で話し合い、評価ができるようにすることである。